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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court err in finding that the pickup truck

owned by the Defendant was/;exempt from execution.
2.

Did the Trial Court err in finding that there was a levy

pursuant to an execution prior to any sale of the truck by Walker.
3.

Did the Trial Court err in finding that Walker failed to

transfer ownership of his truck as required by law prior to the
levy of execution by the County Sheriff.
4.

Walker having failed to designate error on appeal as it

related to the two "Cross Claim Defendants" is he now precluded
from raising the issue upon appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUSES
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Attached hereto as an addendum is a copy of the statutes that
are determinative of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action brought by RVA

Realtors, aka, RVA Service Corporation against the
Defendants/Appellants Ralph L. Walker and Marsha Walker for the
collection of the sums due upon a delinquent promissory note.
The Defendants Ralph L. Walker and Marsha Walker answered the
complaint of the Plaintiff and filed a "Crossclaim" against the
Respondents George W. Preston, Thomas L. Willmore and Credit
Bureau of Logan.
The "Crossclaim" alleged among other things that the
Respondents conspired to deprive Walker of a truck that he had

attempted to convey to Plaintiff in partial satisfaction of the
Plaintiff's claim.

Further alleged causes of action are inten-

tional interference with contracts relations, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, trespass to chattels
and conversion of chattels.
B.

Disposition in Trial Court.

The Respondents filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss the "Crossclaim" which was
granted by the District Court of Cache County.

From this judgment

of dismissal the Defendant and Crossclaimant appeals.

The trial

in the matter of RVA Realtors, Plaintiff v. Ralph L. Walker and
Marsha Walker has at the date hereof not proceeded to final
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Credit 3ureau of Logan obtained a judgment against Ralph
L. Walker on the 20th day of May, 1985, for the sum of $1,858.25.
Following the entry of judgment Walker failed to satisfy the
judgment.

The Credit 3ureau of Logan, on the 24th day of June,

1385, obtained from the Clerk of the Circuit Court an execution
which, together with a precipe Eor execution, was delivered to the
Sheriff of Cache County.
The day before the execution was served on Walker, James
Wilson, the President of the Credit Bureau of Logan, Inc., had
received from Walker a note (Record pg. 41) that stated as
follows:
"Mr. Wilson, I would trade either my truck or Jeep
Cherokee for satisfaction of my obligation to Credit
Bureau. If you are interested let me know". Ralph
Walker 753-6110 (Emphasis added)

On the 25th day of June, the Sheriff of Cache County contacted the Defendant for the purpose of levying upon the pickup
truck described in the precipe for execution.

At that time

Commercial Security Bank of Logan, Utah, held the certificate of
title as security for the payment of an obligation upon the
vehicle.

(Record 51)

vehicle.

(Record 43)

Ralph L. Walker was the owner of the

The precipe directed to the Sheriff omitted the "LH" figure
portion of the license number but contained the correct numerial
designation of 2983.

^he Defendant's name was correctly spelled

in the execution and in the title designation of the precipe but
Ralph was spelled R-A-O-L-P-H in the body of the precipe.

The

serial number was at all times correctly described in the precipe.
Deputy Sheriff Crockett served the execution on Walker on June 25,
1985 at his office in Logan, Utah.

Ralph Walker at that time

promised to bring the pickup truck to the Cache County Sheriff's
Office and leave it in the parking lot together with the keys for
the truck.

(Sheriff Crockett's Affidavit, Record pg. 50)

Walker

indicated to the Sheriff that he had a luncheon appointment and
agreed to honor the levy immediately after the noon hour.
(Crockett Affidavit, pg. 51) Following the noon hour, Deputy
Crockett realized the truck was not in the Cache County Sheriff's
parking lot as Mr. Walker had promised.

He obtained a corrected

precipe to himself, changing the misspelled "Ralph" and adding
"LH" to the license number.

He called Ralph Walker on the

telephone, at that time the Deputy Sheriff was advised by Ralph

Walker that he did not own the truck, that he had just sold the
truck to Russell Anderson.

(Record pg. 51)

The deputy sheriff

immediately went to Ralph Walker's office where Ralph Walker
stated to him that he had sold the truck to Russell Anderson.
(Crockett Affidavit, Record pg. 51)

At that time Walker delivered

to the Sheriff a copy of the Bill of Sale which he purportedly had
negotiated during the noon hour to Russell Anderson.

(Record pg.

55)
The Bill of Sale which Walker claims is entitled to make is
to Russell V. Anderson.

The Plaintiff in this action is RVA

Realtors and RVA Realty Services Corporation.

The debt that is

owed by the Defendant Ralph Walker is owed to RVA Services and not
Russell Anderson.
Walker's Bill of Sale contains neither license number nor
serial number to positively identify the vehicle, and is signed by
Ralph Walker personally and as the president of RLW Development,
Inc.

(Crockett Affidavit, Record pg. 55)
Ralph L. Walker did not execute an owner's transfer on the

Utah Certificate of ^itle following the alleged sale.

(Record pg.

43)
Deputy Crockett ultimately located the truck on July 17,
1985, and took possession of the truck.

Walker wrote to the pre-

sident of the Credit 3ureau as evidenced by a letter found on
record (Record pg. 42) as follows:

"Now that you have executed on my truck I have no choice
but to file which I will do at the latest Monday afternoon. I doubt that the truck will bring much of anything
above what I owe which means I've got nothing and I lose
$2,000.00 equity in the truck. If you want the truck and
assume the loan at CSB you can have it, otherwise, I've
got to file to protect my equity". RLW
The affidavit of Russell V. Anderson of RVA Realtors, aka,
RVA Service Corporation disclaimed any interest in the truck.
(Record pg. 70 -71)
Following the misrepresentation by Walker that he would
deliver the truck to the Cache County Sheriff's Office, the
Sheriff of Cache County located the truck parked at 52 North 1st
East, Logan, Utah.

Walker's license plates were attached to the

truck and bore the designation LH 2983 which had been correctly
set forth on the precipe.

The vehicle identification number was

checked at that time and was verified to be one and the same truck
as registered to the name of Ralph Walker.
(Record pg. 57)

(Crockett Affidavit)

There was no evidence of ownership about the

vehicle other than that of Ralph L. Walker.

(Record pg. 51 - 52)

The Deputy Sheriff took the vehicle into his possession, noticed
the vehicle for sale and sold the truck on August 9, 1985.
(Record pg. 52)

Ralph Walker was not present at the sale.

The

truck was sold for the sum of $129.75 subject, however, to the
lien at Commercial Security Bank.

(Record pg. 52 - 53)

The

complaint in this action was filed on the 25th day of June, 1985,
which is the same day the Sheriff appeared at the office of Ralph
Walker and levied on the vehicle.

Walker was not served with the

summons until after the levy by the Cache County Sheriff.

At the

date hereof no judgment has been entered in that case.
Following the Sheriff's Sale upon the execution James H.
Wilson of the Credit Bureau of Logan, Inc., obtained the certificate of title from Commercial Security Bank by paying the lien
upon the vehicle.

(Record pg. 39)

The Credit Bureau of Loganf Inc., is represented by the firm
of Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers, principally by George W.
Preston.

Thomas Willmore's only involvement was to conduct a

supplemental proceeding after the vehicle was levied upon and
prior to sale for the purpose of determining the ownership of the
vehicle and the ownership of other property owned by Ralph L.
Walker.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

tion.

1.

Standard of Review for Appeal of Summary Judgment.

2.

Plaintiff claims that his truck was exempt from execuHowever, such claim is neither supported by the evidence

nor the law.
3.

The Trial Court did not err in dismissing Walker's

"Crossclaim" as a valid execution was issued by the Court and the
Sheriff, in fact, levied upon the truck.
4.

Walker failed to consumate the sale pursuant to Utah Law

and the levy was therefore valid.
POINT I
UNDER THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENTS THE
DEFENDANT, WALKER IS BARRED FROM INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE AND RAISING ISSUES NOT1 PRESENTED BY HIS "CROSSCLAIM".

This Courtfs inquiry on review is whether there is any
genuine issue as to any material fact, if there is notf whether
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof law*
Thornock v. Cooky Utah, 604 P.2d 934 (1979).
To determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact the
evidence introduced in the District Court is considered most
favorable to Walker.

Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., Utah,

595 P.2d 526 (1979).
Walker's pleading, (a cross claim) is in fact a third party
complaint against new parties and is therefore in the nature of a
complaint.

This pleading fails to raise the issue of the exemp-

tion of the truck from execution.
R.V.A. Realtors.

The pleading claims a sale to

(The bill of sale states the truck was sold to

Russell v. Anderson an individual)
The issues presented to the Trial Court were as follows:
1.

Did the Sheriff of Cache County levy on the Walker

vehicle?
2.

Does the Bill of Sale executed by Walker to Russell v.

Anderson constitute a valid transfer of ownership under Utah Law?
The facts presented under the issues of this case are not in
dispute.

The Bill of Sale and its origin are not disputed.

Its

effectiveness as a means of transferring ownership is a matter of
law.

The facts concerning the levy of execution are not disputed.

The effect of the levy is a matter of law.

Deputy Crockett's ser-

vice of the Writ upon Walker and Walker's promise to bring the
truck to the Cache County Sheriff's Office are really not in

dispute.

Walker does not dispute the fact that after the claimed

transfer to Russell V. Anderson the car was located by Sheriff
Crockett and taken into his possession.

If in fact there was a

failure to make a levy the first time Crockett visited Walker,
Walker does not dispute the validity of the subsequent levy and
Sheriff's Sale.
The issue of the truck being exempt is not raised by Walker's
pleadings and was only raised for the first time in his reply
brief to the District Court.

In the case of Bangerter v. Poulton,

Utah, 663 P.2d 100 (1983) this Court said that:
"(I)t is axiomatic that defenses and claims not
raised by the parties in the trial cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal".
In Snyder v. Merkley, Utah, 693 P.2d 64 (1984) this Court
held:
"Summary judgment should be granted only if the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions
submitted in a case show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It
should be granted only when it clearly appears that
there is no reasonable probability that the party
moved against could prevail".
If Walker's Bill of Sale cannot, by law, transfer title to
Anderson, then the levy, regardless of when it occurred is lawful
and Walker cannot prevail under any theory.

If the Bill of Sale,

under Utah law, is valid, then the issue of law is raised as to
when the levy of execution occurred, before or after the sale of
the truck.

The effect of Walker's promise to deliver the car to

the Sheriff's office is also a matter of law to be determined in
conjunction with the first levy of execution.

There is no genuine issue of fact presented by the Defendant,
Walker.

The Trial Court with the facts presented, correctly

concluded as a matter of law that the levy on the truck was valid.
POINT II
DEFENDANT, WALKER, CLAIMS HIS TRUCK WAS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.
This issue was not pleaded in Walker's "Crossclaim" and was
not addressed as an issue to the District Court.
A review of the documents in evidence as attached to affidavits indicates that the day prior to the execution Walker wrote to
Wilson of the Credit Bureau as follows:
I would trade either my truck or Jeep Cherokee for
satisfaction of my obligation to Credit Bureau. If you
are interested let me know. Ralph L. Walker 753-6110
(Emphasis Added.)
The exemption statutes of the State of Utah as found in
U.C.A. 78-23-8 as amended indicate as follows:
(2) An individual is entitled to an exemption of
implements, professional books, or tools of the trade
of the individual, all having an aggregate value of
not exceeding $1500.00; and one motor vehicle having
a value not exceeding $1500.00 where such motor vehicle
is used for the claimant's business or profession.
Exhibit 1 attached to Walker's Brief is not in evidence and
was not an exhibit before the District Court.
Walker's letter (Record pg. 41, Addendum p. 1) states that
Walker has two vehicles, a truck, which is the vehicle in question
and a Jeep Cherokee.

This letter is dated after the June 6th

letter claiming an exemption, and refers to two vehicles.
after the execution still owned a Jeep Cherokee.

Walker,

Sheriff

Crockett's affidavit states that the Defendant did not appear at
the sale for the purDosP n-p ~i -*-•--•-

The word "exemption" is defined in Section 78-23-2 as protection from subjection to a judicial process to collect an unsecured
debt.

The letter admitting ownership of two vehicles is incon-

sistent with his claim of exemption for two reasons: (a) If the
Defendant has two vehicles only one may be exempt.

The Defendant

presumably still had a Jeep Cherokee to satisfy his exemption
requirement.

It is submitted that either vehicle executed upon by

the Credit 3ureau would have invoked Walker's claim of exemption
notwithstanding the fact that the other car remained in his
possession, and (b) in his claim for exemption, Walker fails to
define his business or profession.

Walker failed either in

writing or in person to set forth the "business or profession" for
which the exemption was claimed.
After the truck was noticed for sale, Walker again wrote to
the President of the Credit Bureau indicating as follows:
"Now that you have executed on m^ truck... "
On one hand Walker claims to have sold the truck, while maintaining after execution and notice of sale that his truck is
exempt.
POINT III
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THAT A LEVY DID NOT OCCUR ON JUNE 25,
1985, BUT 22 DAYS AFTER WALKER HAD SOLD HIS TRUCK.
A.

Walker incorrectly assumes in his brief that the execu-

tion was faulty.
The affidavit of Deputy Sheriff Crockett indicates that at 12
o'clock on the 25th day of June, 1985, he served the execution on

Ralph L. Walker and made the demand upon him for the Ford pickup
truck.

He further indicated that he levied upon the pickup truck

by delivery to Ralph Walker a copy of the execution and precipe
for execution.
The only omission in the precipe was the letter designation
"LH" of the license number.

All other license numerals and the

vehicle identification number were correctly set forth.
Therefore, an immediate identification of the vehicle was
possible.

Upon receiving the levy Walker promised to bring the

pickup truck pursuant to the levy to the Cache County Sheriff's
Office and leave it in the parking lot.

(Crockett Affidavit,

Record pg. 50)
A levy is defined in Section 78-23-1 as the "seizure of property pursuant to any legal process issued for the purpose of
collection of an unsecured debt".
word "seizure".

Many courts have defined the

Generally it means to take into possession either

actually or constructively.

33 C.J.S., Executions, 244.

In the

case of Brunswick Corporation v. Playmore Enterprises, Oregon, 452
P. 2d 533 (1969) the court held as follows:
To make a levy the statute cited above require that
the sheriff must take the property into his possession
or leave a certified copy of the Writ of Execution and
notice specifying the property to be sold on execution
with the person in possession.
Sheriff Crockett's Affidavit, (Record pg. 50 - 52) states
that the execution was served on Ralph L. Walker and demand made
upon him for the Ford pickup.

At that time Walker acknowledged

the levy by promising to bring the pickup pursuant to the levy to

the Cache County Sheriff's Office.

It appears further from sub-

sequent events that the representation made by Walker was false
and made for the purpose of inducing a sheriff into refraining
from taking the property into possession until such time as the
Defendant could make and execute a Bill of Sale, which was exhibited to the Sheriff after the initial service of the execution
upon Walker.

Walker concedes in his affidavit at page 81 of the

record as follows:
I told him that if he possessed a writ with my truck
identified I would cooperate with him and deliver the
truck.
The writ, in fact, described the truck by make, type, serial
number and four numerals of the license number.

The Defendant, by

his own conduct acknowledged the levy upon the truck, although the
truck was not in the presence of the Deputy or taken into physical
possession by the Deputy.

Reasonable and ordinary diligence is

all that is required of a levying officer.

See Mortensen v.

Berzel Investments Co., Arizona, 410 P.2d 689 (1966) where the
Arizona Court said as follows:
Keeping in mind that appellants by their own declaration
to the deputy failed to either cooperate with the levy
by making known the existence of personal property on
which execution might be taken or to avail themselves
of the statutory right afforded to them to make such
designation, we cannot but conclude that they are now
barred by the legal procedures which they have made
no effort to interrupt. Reasonable and ordinary
diligence is all that is required of the levying
officer.
See further the case of Credit Bureau of Brokenbow Inc. v.
Moninger, Nebraska, 284 N.W.2d 855 (1979), where the deputy

serving a writ of execution announced to the judgment debtor as
follows:
"I execute on the pickup for the County of Custer".
The deputy did not take the pickup into his possession.

Three

days later the judgment debtor and a bank executed a security
agreement on the vehicle which was filed.

Notation of the

security interest was made on the title to the pickup that same
day.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in rendering a decision stated
as follows:
"A manual interference with chattels is not essential
to a valid levy thereon. It is sufficient if the property is present and subject for the time to the control
of the officer holding the writ, and that he in express
terms asserts his dominion over it by virtue of such
writ.
The bank would have us hold that the pickup should have
been physically seized to make the levy valid. We do
not believe that failure to take physical possession
in this case goes to the validity of the levy. The
deputy sheriff did all that was required by the laws
of this state with regard to levying under a writ of
execution. Whether or not the officer took physical
possession after he levied relates to the ability of
the officer to produce the property levied on, and to
his possible civil liability for failure to do so, and
to the validity of the levy. It is, of course, possible that the failure of a levying officer to protect
and preserve the property levied upon might give rise
to an action between the officer or his bonding company
and the judgment creditor."
See also Palais et al, v. DeJarnette et al, In Re
Scharton- (s) Estate, Virginia, 145 Fed. Rep. F.2d 145 F.2d 953
(1944).

Further, by virtue of the consent of the debtor to the levy,
the debtor is estopped to now claim the insufficiency of the levy.
See 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Garnishment and Attachment, 777.
"In this connection, however, it should be observed
that a levy may be good as against the defendant in
a writ when it would not be good as against third
persons, this distinction being based not on any
difference in the legal requisites of the levy,
but on the fact that the conduct of the defendant,
either by positive or negative acts, may amount to
a wavier or an estoppel or agreement that that shall
be a levy, which without such conduct would not be
sufficient. As against the defendant, therefore,
no great strictness of form is necessary; the levy
on his property with his consent is sufficient.
It is recognized that there is authority to the contrary,
Belvin v. Beard, Georgia 49 S.E. 2d 546.
B.

Walker's purported sale of the vehicle was ineffectual.

It is apparent that Walker's agreement to deliver the truck
to the Cache County Sheriff was made for the purpose of buying
time so that Walker could attempt to dispose of the vehicle.
The Bill of Sale is ineffectual because it fails to conform
with the statutes of the State of Utah relating to the transfer of
title to vehicles.
Walker claims the sale to Anderson to have taken place on the
25th day of June.

^he Sheriff located the vehicle in a parking

lot on the 17th day of July.

Walker's letter to Wilson after the

17th day of July commences with the statement as follows:
"Now that you have executed on nr£ truck...."
The Bill of Sale standing alone is not effective to transfer title
to a vehicle in the State of Utah.

See 41-1-62 U.C.A. where the

owner is required to remove registration plates from a vehicle
that has been sold.

Also 41-1-63 U.C.A. where the owner is

required to endorse an Assignment and Warranty of Title upon a
valid Certificate of Title for the purpose of changing ownership.
See further 41-1-64 U.C.A. where the new owner before operating
the vehicle is required to return the Certificate of Registration
and Title to the Department of Motor Vehicles and apply for a new
certificate of title.
Section 41-1-72 states that:
Until the department shall have issued a new certificate
of registration and certificate of ownership title shall
not have passed to the new purchaser. (Addendum p. 1)
At all times before, during and after the execution and sale
the truck remained in the name of Ralph L. Walker.

(Record pg.

43) Therefore, assuming for the purpose of argument that the initial levy by the Sheriff is determined not to be a proper levy
under present Utah Law.

Certainly a levy occurred on the 17th of

July, when the Sheriff had the truck towed away for storage
pending sale.

At that time Walker's license plates were still

attached to the truck, the bank's certificate of title was not
endorsed and there was no evidence of a change of ownership of the
vehicle other than a mere bill of sale executed by Walker, which
on its face fails to describe the license number or serial number.
The facts of the case before the court show that Walker's
purported sale of the vehicle was ineffectual as against the levy
of execution by the Credit Bureau of Logan.

The bill of sale

served only to put the Credit Bureau and the Sheriff of Cache

County on notice that Walker was attempting to convey the property
and to exercise more diligence in determining whether a valid sale
had taken place, andf thereforef the Sheriff's Deputy by his own
affidavit was careful to determine that all indicia of: ownership
reflected Walker's continued ownership of the vehicle at the time
that he located the vehicle in the parking lot and at the time of
sale.

(See Record pg. 51 - 52) Reference Credit Bureau of

Brokenbow, Inc. v. Moninger, Infra.

Swartz v. White, Utah, 80 Ut.

150, 13 P.2d 643, (1932); Jackson v. James, Utah, 97 Ut. 41 89
P.2d 235 (1939).
POINT IV
WALKER CLAIMS HE HAD THE RIGHT ^0 CONVEY HIS TRUCK TO
ANOTHER CREDITOR.
These "Crossclaim Defendants" do not dispute the legal principle which provides that a person has the right to apply his property to the payment of some debts to the exclusion of other debts.
However, Walker's attempted conveyance in this case was illusory
by reason of the fact that he failed to conform the transfer of
his interest to the statutes of the State of Utah.

And, after the

levy of execution and prior to the sale, Walker wrote to James
Wilson of the Credit Bureau and admitting that the Credit 3ureau
had executed on "his" truck.

Such an admission is contrary to the

position taken by Walker that he conveyed his interest in the
truck to Anderson.

Walker's conveyance was intended to hinder,

delay, a judgment creditor.

The promise made to the County

Sheriff by Walker that he would deliver the truck to the Sheriff's

Office was made for the purpose of preventing the Sheriff, at that
time, from taking the truck into his possession.
Anderson has never corroborated Walker's conveyance of the
truck to him by claiming an interest in the truck,

(Record pg. 47

and 70)
If Walker has suffered damages he must bear that responsibility.

It is his conduct and misrepresentation that have

caused his damages, if any there might be.
POINT V
WALKER HAS FAILED TO DESIGNATE ANY POINTS ON APPEAL
REGARDING PRESTON AND WILLMORE AND THEREFORE IT SHOULD
BE CONCLUDED THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT STANDS.
Willmore's participation in this case was the conduct of a
Supplemental Proceeding of Walker relative to his assets for the
Credit Bureau of Logan, Inc.
Preston's participation consisted of representing the Credit
Bureau in obtaining the judgment and delivery of the execution to
the Court to be issued and delivery of a precipe to the sheriff.
All actions taken were in behalf of the Credit Bureau.
Walker failed to file a docketing statement giving notice of
any intent to appeal the dismissal of Preston and Willmore.
His brief fails to cite any error of the Trial Court in
dismissing Preston and Willmore as "Cross Claim Defendants".
And, therefore, the dismissal should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Walkerfs Brief assumes that the Bill of Sale standing alone
is sufficient to pass title of the truck to Russell V. Anderson.
Walker's claim must fail by reason of the fact that he failed to
abide by the Statutes of the State of Utah in transferring title
to a motor vehicle*

If Walker's purported transfer was not valid

then Walker's only claim of error would be that the truck was
exempt from execution.

Walker's own letters admit possession of

more than one vehicle, and, therefore, the truck in question could
not be claimed under the exemption.

Therefore, regardless of

whether the court construes the levy of taking place on June 24th
on or July 17th, the levy in fact preceded a legal change of
ownership and Walker was not denied the use of a vehicle as he
still retained ownership of a Jeep Cherokee.
Walker's appeal fails to address issues framed in the
"Crossclaim" Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The only issue here

addressed is the propriety of the Credit Bureau's levy of execution upon a truck.
The issues of Willmore's and Preston's liability to Walker
not being addressed it must be concluded that the dismissal
entered by the District Court is not being appealed from.

(Walker

failed to file a docketing statement giving notice to the
contrary).

Viewing the evidence most favorable to the

"Crossclaimant" the Trial Court did not commit error and the
judgment of the Trial Court should be sustained.

RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this /d

day of March, 1986.

HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS

B. H. Harris,
Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF, to the Defendant, Cross
Claimant and Appellant, Ralph L. Walker, P. 0. Box 254, Bountiful,
Utah 84010, and to the Plaintiff's Attorney, Gordon Low, 175 East
100 North, Logan, Utah 84321, on this /& day of March, 1986.

B* H. Harris

UTAH CODE
19*3-1986

Motor Vehicles

41-1-64. New owner to secure transfer of registration and
sew certificate of title.
41-1-^5 through 41-1-66. Repealed.
41-1-67. Transfer by operation of law.
41-1-63. New owner may register or upon transfer execute
an assignment.
41-1-69. Repealed.
41-1*70. Repealed.
41-1-71. When department to transfer and issue new certificate - Records of certificates and applications.
41*1-72. Necessary before transfer complete.
41-1-73. Manufacturer or dealer to give notice of sale or
transfer.
41-1-74. Assignment by Hen holder.
41-1-75. Release by lien holder to owner.
41-1-76. Failure to endorse and deliver certificate a misde41-1-77. Owner not liable for negligent operation after
'transfer.
41-1-73. Permit required to dismantle motor vehicle.
41-1-79. Use of dismantling permit • Sale or transfer of
vehicle - Rebuilt vehicles.
41-1-79.5. Abandoned and inoperable vehicles • Determination by commission • Disposal of vehicles.
41-1-62. Transfer by owner.
Whenever the owner of a registered vehicle
transfers or assigns his title, or interest, thereto, the
registration of said vehicle shall expire.
The owner shall remove the registration plates
therefrom and within twenty days from the date of
transfer shall forward the same to the department
to be destroyed or may have such plates and the
registration number thereon assigned to another
vehicle upon the payment of the transfer fee
provided by law and subject to the rules and regulations of the department.
1957
41-1-63. Endorsement of assignment and warranty
of tide.
The owner shall endorse an assignment and
warranty of title upon the valid certificate of title
issued for such vehicle by the State of Utah or other
state or country. Said endorsement and assignment
shall include a statement of all liens or encumbrances thereto, and shall be verified under oath by the
owner before a notary public or other person authorized by law to administer oaths, and he shall
deliver the valid certificate of title and certificate of
registration to the purchaser or transferee at the
time of delivering the vehicle, or within 48 hours
thereof, except as provided for under section 41-32.

1979

41-1-64. New owner to secure transfer of registration and new certificate of title.
The transferee before operating or permitting the
operation of such vehicle on a highway shall present
to the department the certificate of registration and
the certificate of title, properly endorsed, and shall
apply for and obtain a new certificate of title for
said vehicle and a new registration therefor, as upon
an original registration, except as permitted to [in]
sections 41-1-65 and 41-1-67.
1963
41-1-65 through 41-1-66. Repealed.

1965

41-1-67. Transfer by operation of law.
Whenever the title or interest of an owner in or
to a registered vehicle shall pass to another,
otherwise than by voluntary transfer, the registration thereof shall expire and the vehicle shall not be
operated upon a highway unless and until the
person entitled to possession of such vehicle shall
apply for and obtain the registration thereof, except
that the vehicle may be operated by the person
CODE»CO
•»—•"» U t a h

41-1-73

entitled to its possession or his legal representative
upon the highways for a distance not exceeding seventy-five miles upon displaying on such vehicle the
registration plates issued to the former owner, or in
the event title has become vested in a person
holding a lien or encumbrance on such vehicle, such
person may apply to the department for and obtain
special plates as may be issued under this act to
dealers and may operate any said repossessed
vehicle under such special plate only for the
purposes of transporting the same to a garage or
warehouse or in demonstrating or selling such
vehicle.
1953
41-1-68. New owner may register or upon transfer
execute an assignment.
Upon amy such transfer a new owner may either
secure a new registration and certificate of title on
proper application, upon presentation of such instruments or documents of authority or certified
copies thereof as may be sufficient or required by
law to evidence or effect a transfer of title oi
interest in or to chattels in such case, or such new
owner, upon transferring his title or interest to
another person shall execute and acknowledge an
assignment and warranty of title and deliver the
same, also the documents of authority or certified
copies i hereof as may be sufficient or required by
law to evidence the right of such person, to the
person to whom such transfer is made.
19S3
41-1-69. Repealed.

1915

41-1-70. Repealed.

1977

41-1-71. When department to transfer and issue
new certificate • Records of certificates and applications.
The department upon receipt of a properly
endorsed certificate of title and certificate of registration and proper application for registration, accompanied by the required fee and when satisfied as
to the genuineness and regularity of such transfer
and the right of the transferee to a certificate of
title, shall reregister the vehicle as upon a new registration in the name of the new owner and issue a
new certificate of registration and a certificate of
title as upon an original application.
The department shall retain and appropriately file
every surrendered certificate of title and every application for title for a period of not less than five
years, such file to be so maintained as to permit the
tracing of title of the vehicles designated therein. A
microfilmed copy of a departmental record, accompanied by certification, shall be admissible in any
court in like manner as the original document.
1963
41-1-72. Necessary before transfer complete.
Until the department shall have issued such new
certificate of registration and certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be registered
shall be deemed not to have been made and title
thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and
said intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid or effective for any
purpose except as provided in section 41-1-77.
19S3
41-1-73. Manufacturer or dealer to give notke of
sale or transfer.
Every manufacturer or dealer upon transferring a
vehicle of a type subject to registration hereunder,
whether by sale, lease or otherwise, to any person
other than a manufacturer or dealer, shall immediately give written notice of such transfer to the de-

For ANNOTATIONS, consult the latest UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS.
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BILL OF SALE

/ ///
LA
i^.M^r^M^s

\/d^^^^

Doiiars
In consideration of
($//!
), receipt of which
_ .
w
is hereby
acknowledged,
the undersigned, herei^i referred to as seller, hereby nells
and
delivers to /£oU4<M U>^U^ccui^ the following described
automobile
.v'

l
Make m Eo&V
L " ^ fScJtuf
Identification or '
Engine Number
Serial Number
Bo
Year
ar Manufactured
liKdLm ^^^^^
Model Number f*/en>
"

Seller hereby warrants that he is the legal owner
of such automobile, that it is free froip all liens/and
cumbrances
^ ^ except
&?*hyAjeAjitd£<x^
that he has the right to sell the same7 andthat he will
warrant and defend the title thereof against the claims and
demands of^11 persons
except the
Dated

U/Xf/oe

. 1985.

Judd Preston, Attorney
Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
Dear Mr. Preston:
In regards to the case with The Herald Journal andunly&ierf
and Steve Brown, I am in at least ten other complaints^ OT the
The reason I fought the case is
same nature with Mr. Brown.
that I wanted to know how the judge would rule on the relationship'
with myself and Mr. Brown.
I believe Mr. Brown to be liable for all of the cases that
I am presently being sued on and that I would be unable to collect*
anything if I sued Mr. Brown.
Because of this situation, I
must either make a settlement with all of the plaintiffs or
file for protection under one of the various chapters of the
bankruptcy code. I therefore make you this offer:
1)
That I sign a note with the Credit Bureau for $624.26
to be paid in monthly installments over the next 24 months toget
with 10% interest payments of $28.81.
2)
That the Credit Bureau release the judgment from th^.
record so that I may continue in business without the judgment. Y/
I would agree to a stipulation to the above which would not ^
require a complete new trial to collect.
y
3)
All of the above is subject to other parties settling^
on reasonable terms and interest rates provided that other creditors
may extend for longer periods for amounts over $10,000.
Please discuss the above with your client and let me kn
if this would be acceptable.
Sincerely,

Ralph L. Walker, CCIM

RLW/pb

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
RVA REALTORS, aka RVA SERVICES
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff
v.
RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M.
WALKER,
Defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 23305

RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M.
WALKER,
Cross-Claimant,
v.
GEORGE PRESTON, THOMAS WILLMORE,
and CREDIT BUREAU OF LOGAN,
Cross-Claim Defendants
Motions have been filed on behalf of George Preston, Thomas
Willmore, and the Credit Bureau of Logan, and a Motion to Dismiss
the Crossclaim of Defendant, Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker.
The Motion to Dismiss is based on a valid execution after
judgment on a certain truck.

The crossclaim is based on allegations

it is a wrongful execution since it has been sold to another party.
It has been sold to another party but in the defendant's response
it is noted that the bill of sale was made after the Sheriff had
levied on the truck.

Nothing in the record that would indicate

there was any procedural errors in the execution.
Therefore, the Motions are granted.

Cousel for Preston, Willmore,

and the Credit Bureau to prepare the appropriate orders and
the matter remanded back to the Circuit Court for trial
original complaint.

RVA Realtors v. Ralph L. Walker
Civil #23305
Page Two

Dated this

5th

day of December, 19 85,
BY THE COURT:

reNOW tafr is£&f£ e r s e n
D i s t r i c t iludge

; o J ho above ma!!; J i o
Ralph L v Walker - 135S~Lak«--V±ew Drr - B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010
B, H, Harris
31 Federal TW^'^-'Toganf Utah 84321
"s • i 5 £ h ; fe?f >.JDecemheS:
- § H 3. ALLEN, C... /
»puty
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B. H. Harris 1381
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS
Attorney for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RVA REALTORS, aka RVA SERVICES
CORPORATION

*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
*

RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M.
WALKER,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
Civil No. 23305

Defendants
RALPH L. WALKER,
Cross Claimant,
vs.

*
*
*
*

GEORGE PRESTON, THOMAS WILLMORE *
and CREDIT BUREAU OF LOGAN
Cross Claim Defendants
THIS Matter came on before the Court upon Cross Claim
Defendants, George Preston, Thomas Willmore and Credit Bureau of
Logan Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and the Court
having received and reviewed the Memorandum of the Cross Claim
Defendants and the Memorandum of the Defendants, Ralph and Marsha
Walker, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now
enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Cross Claim Defendant, Credit Bureau of Logan,

obtained a Judgment in the amount of $1,886.00, against the
Defendant, Ralph L. Walker and Century 21 Realty Services on the
2nd day of May, 1985, in the Second Circuit Court, State of Utah,
County of Cache, Logan City Department.
2.

That pursuant to the execution and upon the precipe of

the Credit Bureau of Logan, the Circuit Court issued a Writ of
Execution directed to the Sheriff of Cache County.

The Writ of

Execution was valid and directed the Sheriff of Cache County to
levy upon a Ford pickup truck titled in the name of the Defendant
Ralph L. Walker.
3.

On the 24th day of June, 1985, the Sheriff of Cache

County levied upon the Ford pickup truck titled in the Defendant,
Ralph L. Walker's name.
4.

Defendants' response concedes that the Bill of Sale was

made after the Sheriff had levied on the truck and by reason
thereof the Sheriff's levy was a lawful and valid levy upon the
property of the Defendant, Ralph L. Walker.
5.

That the sale of the truck pursuant to the levy of execu-

tion was conducted by the Sheriff in accordance with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

There is no material issue of fact in this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

RRIS.PRESTON,

1.

That the Credit Bureau of Logan has a valid judgment

KE & CHAMBERS
ORNEYS-AT-LAW

EOERALAVENUE
G A N . UTAH 84321

against

the

Defendant,

Ralph

L.

Walker.

<A1

2.

That the Second Circuit Courtf Logan City Department

issued a valid execution upon the judgment of the Credit Bureau of
Logan directing the Sheriff to levy upon a Ford pickup truck owned
by the Defendant, Ralph L. Walker.
3.

That the Sheriff of Cache County's levy upon the Ford

truck was lawful and in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4.

That by virtue of the levy of execution upon the truck

the Defendant Ralph L. Walker was not denied a property right, nor
has been no interference with any contractual relations between
the Defendant Ralph L. Walker and RVA Realtors.
5.

That the Defendant Ralph L. Walker has asserted no valid

causes of action against the Cross Claim Defendants as there is
nothing in the record that would indicate there was any procedural
errors in the execution.
7.

That judgment should enter accordingly.

DATED this

day of December, 1985.

DISTRICT JUDGE

m

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to
Ralph L. Walker at 1355 Lakeview Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010, on
this

day of December, 1985.

B« H. Harris

B. H. Harris 1381
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS
Attorney for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RVA REALTORS, aka RVA SERVICES
CORPORATION

*
*

Plaintiff,
vs.
*
RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M.
WALKER,

J U D G M E N T

*
C i v i l No. 23305

Defendants
RALPH L. WALKER,
Cross Claimant,

GEORGE PRESTON, THOMAS WILLMORE *
and CREDIT BUREAU OF LOGAN
*

Cross Claim Defendants
THIS Matter came on before the Court on the 5th day of
December, 1985, upon the motion of the Cross Claim Defendants to
dismiss the cross complaint of Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M.
Walker, and the Court having reviewed the motion and memorandums
of the Cross Claim Defendants and the replies thereto by Cross
Claimants Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker, and the Court
having found that there is no material issue of fact between the

Ice

parties and having taken the matter into advisement and having
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it
is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

That the Cross Claim of the Defendants, Ralph L. and

Marsha M. Walker against George Preston, Thomas Willmore and
Credit Bureau of Logan, dated the 19th day of October, 1985, is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

The above entitled matter is hereby remanded back to the

Circuit Court for trial upon the complaint of Plaintiff RVA
Realtors v. Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker.
DATED this

day of December, 1985.

CIRCUIT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing JUDGMENT to Ralph L. Walker at 1355 Lakeview
Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010, on this

day of December, 1985.

B. H. Harris

/Cf

